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Abstract
Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-
ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because
it is practically difficult to implement or impossible to enforce. We study so-called anonymous
auctions to understand the revenue tradeoffs and to develop simple anonymous auctions that
are approximately optimal.
We consider digital goods settings and show that the optimal anonymous, dominant strategy
incentive compatible auction has an intuitive structure — imagine that bidders are randomly
permuted before the auction, then infer a posterior belief about bidder i’s valuation from the
values of other bidders and set a posted price that maximizes revenue given this posterior.
We prove that no anonymous mechanism can guarantee an approximation better than Θ(n)
to the optimal revenue in the worst case (or Θ(logn) for regular distributions) and that even
posted price mechanisms match those guarantees. Understanding that the real power of anony-
mous mechanisms comes when the auctioneer can infer the bidder identities accurately, we show
a tight Θ(k) approximation guarantee when each bidder can be confused with at most k “higher
types”. Moreover, we introduce a simple mechanism based on n target prices that is asymp-
totically optimal and build on this mechanism to extend our results to m-unit auctions and
sponsored search.
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Award CCF-1101491. Parts of this work were done while the author was an intern at Yahoo Labs.
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1 Introduction
So it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you can win a hundred
battles without a single loss.
If you only know yourself, but not your opponent, you may win or may lose.
If you know neither yourself nor your enemy, you will always endanger yourself.
(Sun Tzu, The Art of War)
In 1981, Myerson elegantly derived the revenue-optimal way to sell a single item [12] — each
buyer’s bid is transformed through a personalized virtual valuation function and then submitted
to a standard second-price auction. Myerson’s auction leverages precise prior beliefs in order to
identify the bidder who generates the highest marginal expected revenue, allowing the seller to
discriminate among bidders and extract more money from those with a higher willingness to pay.
For all its mathematical beauty, Myerson’s optimal auction violates an inherently desirable
property: fairness. One definition of fairness says that the auctioneer should not a priori discrimi-
nate among the auction’s participants. It is a property that may be both desirable and necessary
— it is undeniably philosophically important in many applications; moreover, many settings lack
a strong notion of identity, precluding explicit discrimination.
Sponsored search illustrates the practical importance and limitations of treating bidders equally
ex-ante. A typical sponsored search auction run by Google, Bing, or Yahoo matches bidders to
ad slots on a page of search results — higher slots get more clicks, so higher bidders get higher
slots. Suppose that the search engine identifies a group of queries where the market is thin, so the
top bid is much higher than the second one. The search engine would like to enforce a premium
price for the top slot; however, this effectively requires discriminating against the highest bidder.1
Unfortunately, ex-ante discrimination may not be possible. Advertisers who are large will desire
and demand “fair” treatment; due to their size, they will have the negotiating power to get it.
Advertisers who are small lack the clout to demand equality; however, they are plentiful and could
copy their accounts, blending into the masses to avoid explicit discrimination. As a result, search
platforms like Google, Bing, and Yahoo may be prohibited from such discrimination out of necessity.
In this paper, we study the value of discriminating among your opponents in advance. Myerson’s
optimal auction critically requires that the seller know the identities of bidders ex-ante, so that he
can price discriminate among them — our goal is to quantify tradeoff inherent in requiring ex-ante
fairness in dominant strategy incentive compatible auctions.
Anonymous Mechanism Design. An anonymous auction treats all bidders equally ex-ante.
While the auctioneer may know information about the kinds of bidders who will participate —
even knowing precise prior beliefs about bidders’ values — this information cannot ex-ante be used
to discriminate among them. Alternatively, one may say that the auctioneer knows precise priors
but does not know which prior belongs to which bidder. Technically, an auction is anonymous if
and only if it is symmetric in the sense that permuting bids will analogously permute allocations
and prices.
To see the potential power of anonymous mechanisms, consider the following example: two
bidders have values v1 = $2 and v2 = $1 for a digital good, and the auctioneer knows these values
precisely. The optimal mechanism gives an item to each bidder, charges the first bidder p1 = $2
1In some sense, the search engine would like to set a reserve price for the top slot. However, this must be carefully
defined when no bidder meets the reserve price or when more than one bidder meets it; the decreasing price mechanism
we discuss later in this paper may be considered a natural interpretation of setting different reserve prices for different
slots in a sponsored search auction.
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and the second bidder p2 = $1 for a total revenue of $3. What can anonymous mechanisms do?
A simple posted price will make revenue at most $2, but the following mechanism will extract the
optimal revenue: if one bidder bids $2 and another bids $1, give items to both and charge each
bidder her value for a total revenue of $3; if both bidders bid $2, give items to both and charge
them both $1 for a revenue of $2; otherwise, do not give anyone anything. It is easy to check that
this mechanism is both symmetric and incentive compatible.
We begin by characterizing the optimal anonymous auction that is dominant strategy incentive
compatible and ex-post individually rational. We show that it has a simple intuition in the digital
goods setting: (1) imagine that bidders are relabeled uniformly at random before participating in
the auction, then (2) use v−i to infer a posterior belief about vi and (3) choose a posted price
for bidder i that maximizes revenue given this posterior. This intuition generalizes beyond the
digital goods setting when the inferred posterior is regular. Some simple cases bear mention here:
if the auctioneer’s prior is the same for all bidders (an IID setting) or if it is impossible to confuse
bidders, the optimal anonymous auction will correctly deduce everyone’s identity and coincide with
the unconstrained optimal auction.
With a basic understanding of anonymous auctions in hand, we study the performance of
anonymous digital-goods auctions; our results are not immediately encouraging. We begin with a
single-price mechanism — a simple and naturally anonymous auction — and show that it offers only
a Θ(n) approximation in general and a Θ(log n) approximation when priors are regular. Moreover,
we show that the above results are tight even for the class of all anonymous mechanisms: prior
beliefs exist so that no anonymous auction can guarantee revenue approximation better than Θ(n)
to the revenue of Myerson’s optimal auction while if bidders’ values are known to be drawn from
uniform distributions, we can prove a lower-bound of Ω(log n). Together, these suggest that gen-
eral anonymous mechanisms cannot achieve better asymptotic guarantees than pricing in general
settings and can be very far from optimal.
Having shown that anonymity can hurt revenue substantially in the worst case, we ask whether
there are particular conditions under which anonymous auctions perform well. Our characterization
of the optimal mechanism gives us hope: if all bidders are almost identical or almost perfectly
distinguishable, then the optimal anonymous mechanism should be close to the unconstrained
optimal one. In order to formalize this observation, we consider k-ambiguous distributions where
each bidder can be confused with at most k bidders with “higher ranked distributions” and show
that anonymous mechanisms can guarantee a Θ(k) approximation to the optimal revenue.
Moreover, we introduce the decreasing price mechanism, a simple mechanism that naturally
generalizes single price mechanisms and matches the asymptotic guarantees of the best anonymous
auction. Intuitively, the mechanism is succinctly defined by a set of n prices p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pn, where
pi is the price that the i-th-highest bidder should pay. The decreasing price mechanism implements
this idea with the minimal modifications required to maintain incentive compatibility. Notably, this
auction has linear description complexity, whereas the description complexity of the true optimal
anonymous mechanism may be exponential or even unbounded for continuous distributions since
it might offer a wide range of different prices to a bidder depending on what others bid.
Finally, we show how our decreasing price mechanism can be extended to anonymous mech-
anisms for m-unit auctions and sponsored search with the same Θ(k) guarantee for k-ambiguous
distributions. As motivated above, a sponsored search platform may wish to charge a premium for
certain slots based on the demand profile of a market. Without the ability to discriminate among
bidders, the platform may be constrained to run an anonymous auction.2 A slight modification to
2Many factors, such as click-through-rates (CTRs) and relevance scores, will break symmetry in a sponsored search
auction. As discussed in Ashlagi [2], these can be handled in a variety of ways, e.g. by requiring symmetry among
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our decreasing price mechanism offers a way to do this.
Related Work. Deb and Pai [7] also study the problem of designing a revenue maximizing mech-
anism under the anonymity constraint. They devise a set of allocation and payment functions such
that in equilibrium bidders pay the Myerson virtual values of their corresponding distributions and
the seller achieves revenue that matches the optimal revenue in the unrestricted case. Their results
are only for a single item, their mechanisms are BIC and BIR and their solution implementation
is Bayes Nash Equilibrium. In contrast, attempting to get more robust and practical results, we
require our mechanisms to be dominant strategy IC and ex-post IR and our implementation in
Dominant Strategies.
Ashlagi [2] characterizes anonymous truth-revealing position auctions. He shows that under
two different notions of anonymity, namely anonymity of the allocation rule and utility symmetry,
every truth-revealing position auction is a VCG position auction. His work applies to deterministic
auctions and doesn’t consider optimizing revenue.
A variety of problems in the optimal auction literature employ similar ideas to reach different
ends. Hartline and Roughgarden [10] study simple mechanisms that maximize seller revenue for
selling a single item. They show that when bidder distributions are regular, a second price auction
with a single reserve — a simple anonymous mechanism — offers a constant fraction of the revenue
that is achievable by Myerson’s optimal auction [12]. Prior-independent mechanisms (e.g. [9, 15])
assume values are drawn I.I.D. to infer a distribution from v−i to approximate the optimal revenue
when the prior is not known. In contrast, anonymity will only be a significant constraint when
values are non-I.I.D. and the optimal auction must discriminate among them. Optimal auctions
for correlated bidders also use v−i to infer a posterior over vi (see e.g. [5, 13]). We will see that
the optimal anonymous auction is closely related to the optimal general auction for a particular
correlated prior.
2 Model and Preliminaries
A seller has m identical items to sell to n bidders. Each bidder i has a private valuation vi for
getting one item. The profile of agent valuations is denoted by v = (v1, . . . , vn). The valuations of
the agents are drawn from a product distribution F = F1 × · · · × Fn.
A mechanism M = (A,P) consists of an allocation function A and a pricing function P.
Definition 2.1 (Anonymous Mechanisms). A mechanism is anonymous if permuting the arguments
of v also permutes the resulting allocations and prices.3
Definition 2.2 (Monotone Mechanisms). A mechanism is monotone if for all profiles v, we have
that Ai(v) ≥ Aj(v)⇔ vi ≥ vj for all i, j.
Every agent seeks to maximize his utility Ui(v) = Ai(v)vi − P(v).
Throughout the paper, we are focused on mechanisms that are Dominant Strategy Incentive
Compatible (DSIC) and ex-post individually rational (ex-post IR). DSIC means means that an
agent cannot improve his utility (expected valuation minus price) by bidding a different valuation
even if he knows all the valuations that other agents bid.
bidders with the same CTR or score. We follow Ashlagi and consider a simple model without such parameters to
avoid these complexities.
3For deterministic mechanisms, this definition is unsatisfactory because tiebreaking rules are inherently asym-
metric. Ashlagi [2] discusses a refined notion of anonymous mechanisms that supports tiebreaking in deterministic
mechanisms. We generally allow randomized mechanisms, so we keep this definition for simplicity.
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Definition 2.3 (Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible). A mechanism is dominant strategy
incentive compatible if for all profiles v, we have that Ai(v)vi −Pi(v) ≥ Ai(v−i, v′i)vi −Pi(v−i, v′i)
for all v,v′, i.
Ex-post IR means that a bidder is always better-off participating in the mechanism:
Definition 2.4 (Ex-Post IR). A mechanism is ex-post individually rational if for all profiles v, we
have that Ai(v)vi − Pi(v) ≥ 0
3 Optimal Anonymous Auctions
First, we study optimal anonymous auctions and show that they have a natural structure —
informally, the mechanism uses the values of others v−i to infer a posterior belief h about bidder i’s
value, then maximizes revenue in the standard way subject to the posterior beliefs h (maximizing
virtual value and charging the associated single-parameter payments [12, 1]). In the special case of
a digital goods auction, each bidder is offered the item at the optimal posted price for her inferred
distribution h.
First, since anonymous mechanisms generate the same outcome when bidders are permuted, we
observe the following:
Observation 3.1. The optimal anonymous mechanism remains optimal if we randomly rename
bidders before running the auction.
Moreover, if any mechanism’s prior beliefs are symmetric, then bidders can be relabeled without
affecting the mechanism’s expected revenue:
Observation 3.2. Suppose that prior beliefs F are symmetric (possibly correlated). Then there
exists a symmetric mechanism that maximizes revenue.
These observations immediately lead to the following claim that allows us to reduce the problem
of finding the optimal symmetric auction to optimizing:
Claim 3.3. Any mechanism that is optimal among DSIC and ex-post IR mechanisms for the
symmetric distribution
g(x) =
1
n!
∑
π∈Π(n)
∏
i∈N
fi(xπi)
can be transformed into a mechanism that is optimal among symmetric, DSIC, and ex-post IR
auctions for the beliefs F by relabeling bidders according to a uniformly random permutation.
Building on this claim, our characterization theorem for digital goods follows by characterizing
the optimal auction for g:
Theorem 3.4. The optimal anonymous digital goods auction offers bidder i a copy of the item at
the revenue-maximizing price given h(vi|v−i), the posterior belief about vi given v−i.
For mechanisms beyond digital goods, we can apply a theorem of Roughgarden and Talgam-
Cohen [13] to characterize the optimal auction for g as long as inferred posterior h is regular — the
resulting optimal mechanism will infer h and maximize virtual value with respect to h. For details,
see Appendix A.
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Proof. Following Claim 3.3, it is equivalent to study the optimal auction for the correlated dis-
tribution g. We know from Myerson and others [12, 1], that a normalized mechanism M will be
DSIC if and only if Ai is monotone in vi and payments are given by P(v) = vA(v)−
∫ v
0 A(z)dz. In
addition, when distributions fi are independent, a clever change-of-variables
We can thus write the expected revenue Ri from bidder i as
Ri =
∫
ℜn+
Pi(v)g(v)dv
=
∫
ℜn+
(
viAi(v) −
∫ vi
0
Ai(v−i, z)dz
)
g(v)dv
=
∫
ℜn−1+
∫
ℜ+
g(v−i, vi)Ai(v−i, vi)
(
vi −
∫∞
vi
g(v−i, z)dvi
g(v−i, vi)
)
dvidv−i
If we let h(vi|v−i) denote the density of vi that we can infer given v−i, H the associated CDF, and
φh|v−i(vi) its Myersonian virtual value, we have
h(vi|v−i) = g(v−i, vi)∫∞
0 g(v−i, z)dz
and φh|v−i(vi) = vi − 1−H(vi|v−i)
h(vi|v−i)
and can rearrange to get
Ri =
∫
ℜn−1+
(∫ ∞
0
g(v−i, z)dz
)∫
ℜ+
h(vi|v−i)Ai(v−i, vi)φh|v−i(vi)dvidv−i .
It remains to choose A, which can be done in an arbitrary (monotone) way for digital goods. The
inner integral
∫
hAiφdvi is precisely the revenue when bidder i has value distributed according to
h(vi|v−i), so Myerson [12] tells us that the optimal allocation Ai(v−i, vi) is a posted price to bidder
i that maximizes revenue given the distribution h.
A few noteworthy extreme cases arise when the auctioneer can identify bidder i given only the
bids v−i:
Corollary 3.5. If the distributions fi are point distributions (bidders’ values are known precisely
to the auctioneer), have non-overlapping support, or are the same for all bidders, then the optimal
anonymous mechanism coincides with Myerson’s optimal mechanism.
In all three cases, the posterior distribution inferred from v−i is precisely fi, therefore the
auction precisely identifies each bidder and runs the optimal auction.
These results suggest that anonymous mechanisms perform best when we can differentiate
among the bidders; indeed, we will see that this is necessary. In Section 4, we show that the
anonymity constraint substantially limits revenue even when distributions are discrete over n points
and that assumptions like regularity of fi are insufficient. In Section 5, we show that the perfor-
mance degrades continuously with the auctioneer’s ability to differentiate among the bidders.
4 Worst-Case Approximations
We compare the revenue guarantees of single price and anonymous mechanisms and find that that
anonymous mechanisms can do no better in the worst case.
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4.1 Single Price Mechanisms
We first look at how well single price mechanisms for m-unit auctions performs compared to the
optimal. A single price mechanism allocates items to the m highest bidders with values exceeding p
and charges them the maximum of p and the m+1 highest bid. 4 It is easy to see that single price
mechanisms can get at least a 1n fraction of the revenue by choosing as price the Myerson reserve
price of a bidder’s distribution chosen uniformly at random. However, such a linear approximation
guarantee is unavoidable as we can also show a linear a lower bound of m for the approximation.
Theorem 4.1 (Single Price for General Distributions). For general distributions, a single price
gives a Θ(m) approximation to the optimal revenue.
Proof. Consider the case where each bidder i has a value of 1
ǫi
with probability ǫi and 0 otherwise.
Then, the optimal mechanism gets a revenue of at least m by posting a price to each bidder equal to
his high value and selling to the m largest. On the other hand, charging a single price to everyone
gives at most maxi
1
ǫi
∑
j≥i ǫ
j ≤ 11−ǫ .
However, when all agent distributions are regular, we can show that single price mechanisms
perform much better.
Theorem 4.2 (Single Price for Regular Distributions). For regular distributions, a single price
gives a Θ(logm) approximation to the optimal revenue.
Proof. To prove the theorem we will apply Theorem 4.1 from [3] which states that running VCG
with the median of each agent’s distribution as a reserve price (VCG-m) gives a 4-approximation
to the optimal revenue. Therefore, it suffices to prove that the revenue of single price mechanisms
is a Θ(logm) to that of VCG-m.
Let pi be the median prices for each bidder and assume that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn.
The revenue of VCG-m comes from 2 different sources: reserve prices, where a bidder is charged
his reserve price, and competition between bidders, where a bidder is charged the bid of someone
else.
If more than half of the revenue comes from competition between bidders, setting a price 0 for
all bidders and running a simple VCG gives a 2-approximation. This is because the revenue that
comes from competition in VCG-m is at most m times the m+ 1 largest bid which is equal to the
revenue of VCG with no reserve prices.
Otherwise, more than half of the revenue comes from charging the reserve prices to bidders.
In this case, the revenue is at most equal to 2
∑m
i=1 pi. Consider a mechanism that charges each
price pi with probability qi = (iHm)
−1. The revenue of this mechanism is
∑m
i=1 qipiE[# bids ≥ pi].
However, we have that E[# bids ≥ pi] ≥ i/2 since each of the first i bidders has at least 1/2 of
exceeding pi. This gives a revenue of
∑m
i=1(iHm)
−1pi(i/2) =
∑m
i=1 pi
2Hm
which is a 4Hm approximation
to 2
∑m
i=1 pi.
This bound is tight even for bidders coming from point distributions. Suppose that each bidder
i has a value of 1/i. The best single price gets revenue of 1 while the optimal mechanism gets
revenue Hm = Θ(logm).
4This is a regular VCG mechanism with a reserve price p.
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4.2 Symmetric Mechanisms
For general anonymous mechanisms, we show that even if we pick the best symmetric mechanism
we cannot get any better asymptotic guarantees than single price for general distributions.
Theorem 4.3 (Optimal Symmetric Mechanism for General Distributions). The optimal symmetric
mechanism M gives a Θ(m) approximation to the optimal revenue for general distributions.
Proof. We revisit the construction from the Theorem 4.1 but lower the probability that a bidder
gets a high value even further. Each bidder i now has a value of 1
ǫi
with probability δǫi and 0
otherwise. The optimal asymmetric mechanism gets a revenue of nδ. The optimal symmetric
mechanism must charge the same price whenever there is only one bidder with a high bid. Let E
be the event that at least two bidders value the item high. Given ¬E, the mechanism is identical
to a single price mechanism. So the approximation of the optimal symmetric mechanism is upper
bounded by
δ 1
1−ǫ
+Pr[E]Rev[E]
nδ ≤ 1n(1−ǫ) + Pr[E]Rev[E]nδ . The theorem follows since Pr[E]Rev[E]nδ goes to
0 as δ → 0.
Moreover, we can show that general symmetric mechanisms cannot beat the asymptotic guar-
antees that single price mechanisms achieve for regular distributions. In fact, we can show that
this is true even for uniform distributions.
Theorem 4.4 (Uniform distributions counterexample). For uniform distributions, the best sym-
metric mechanism gets at most a Θ(logm) approximation to the optimal revenue.
4.2.1 Proof of Theorem 4.4
We consider a digital goods case where there are N = (2n − 1)L agents, where 2iL agents have
distributions in U [0, 2−i] for i ∈ {0, ..., n− 1}. We can see that the optimal asymmetric mechanism
gets a revenue of Ln4 by charging each agent a price at the midpoint of his distribution.
We will now upper bound the revenue that the optimal symmetric mechanism achieves. To do
this we consider an instance where a vector of values v is reported.
Let bi = #{j|vj > 2−i}, i.e. the number of agents with values greater than 2−i. We will show
that if all bi’s are large, the optimal symmetric mechanism charges a very low price to each agent.
Lemma 4.5. If bi > (
2
32
i − 1)L + 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, the optimal symmetric mechanism
charges a price lower than 2−(n−1) to every agent.
Proof. Since we are in a digital goods setting we can apply Theorem 3.4 and consider the distri-
bution that the mechanism infers for an agent k’s value by looking at all bids of the other agents.
The probability density of agent’s k value at a point x given the bids v−k of the other agents is
h(x|v−k) = 1n!
∑
π∈Π(n) fπk(x)
∏
i 6=k fπi(vi), which is proportional to the number of ways to match
agents to probability distributions for the bid vector v′ = (v−k, x).
We can compute the number of ways exactly in terms of b′i = #{j|v′j > 2−i} as
∏n−1
i=0 ((2
i+1 −
1)L − b′i)b′i+1−b′i where the notation (a)b ≡ a(a − 1)...(a − b + 1) denotes the falling factorial and
b′n is defined to be equal to N . This is because the b
′
1 agents that have values in [1/2, 1] can
only be in the distributions U [0, 1] so there are L choices for distributions which means there are
L(L− 1)...(L − b′1 + 1) ways to match them. For the b′2 − b′1 agents that have values in [1/4, 1/2],
there are 3L possible distributions (L that are U[0,1] and and 2L that are U[0,1/2]) but b′1 of them
are already taken so there are exactly (3L− b′1)b′2−b′1 choices over all and so on.
We now show that 4h(x|v−k) < h(y|v−k) for x ∈ (2−t, 2−(t−1)), y ∈ (2−(t+1), 2−t) and 1 ≤
t ≤ n − 1. That is the probability density at the interval (2−t, 2−(t−1)) is at most a fourth of
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the probability density at the interval (2−(t+1), 2−t). Let b′(x) and b′(y) be the corresponding
b′ parameters for x and y respectively. It is easy to see that b′i(x) = b
′
i(y) for i 6= t and that
b′t(x) = b
′
t(y) + 1. We have that:
h(x|v−k)
h(y|v−k) =
∏n−1
i=0 ((2
i+1 − 1)L− b′i(x))b′i+1(x)−b′i(x)∏n−1
i=0 ((2
i+1 − 1)L− b′i(y))b′i+1(y)−b′i(y)
=
∏t
i=t−1((2
i+1 − 1)L− b′i(x))b′i+1(x)−b′i(x)∏t
i=t−1((2
i+1 − 1)L− b′i(y))b′i+1(y)−b′i(y)
=
(2t − 1)L− b′t(y)
(2t+1 − 1)L− b′t(y)
cancelling all identical terms
<
(2t − 1)L− (232t − 1)L
(2t+1 − 1)L− (232t − 1)L
since b′t(y) ≥ bt − 1 > (
2
3
2t − 1)L
=
1
32
t
4
32
t
=
1
4
We now show that the optimal price for the inferred distribution is less than 2−(n−1). Assume
that this is not the case and the optimal price is p > 2−(n−1). We will show that by charging p/2
we get strictly more revenue. We will prove by induction that Pr[x > p] < Pr[x > p/2]/2 for
p ∈ [2−(n−1), 2). This is trivial to see if p ∈ [1, 2) since Pr[x > p] = 0 while Pr[x > p/2] > 0.
Assume that Pr[x > p] < Pr[x > p/2]/2 for p ∈ [2−i, 2−i+1). Then for p ∈ [2−i−1, 2−i) we have
that:
Pr[x > p] =Pr[x > 2−i] + Pr[x ∈ (p, 2−i)]
<
Pr[x > 2−i−1]
2
+ Pr[x ∈ (p, 2−i)] by the induction hypothesis
<
Pr[x > 2−i−1]
2
+
Pr[x ∈ (p2 , 2−i−1)]
2
since
h(x|v−k)
h(x/2|v−k)
<
1
4
for x ∈ (p, 2−i)
=Pr[x > p/2]/2
We conclude that Pr[x > p] < Pr[x > p/2]/2 which implies that pPr[x > p] < pPr[x > p/2]/2,
i.e. the revenue we get by charging p is less than charging p/2 if p > 2−(n−1).
We now show that for large enough L the conditions of Lemma 4.5 are satisfied with extremely
high probability.
Lemma 4.6. Let L = 25n and let E be the event that bi > (
2
32
i − 1)L + 1 for all i. Then
Pr[E] < 1− ne−2n−2 .
Proof. Consider the expectation of bi.
E[bi] =
∑
j
Pr[vj > 2
−i] = L20(1− 2−i) + L21(1− 2−i+1) + ...+ L2i−1(1− 2−1)
= L

2i − 1− 2i i∑
j=1
2−2j

 = L(2i − 1− 2i 1− 2−2i
3
)
= L
(
2
3
2i − 1 + 2
−i
3
)
We have that E[bi](1− 2−2n) > 25n
(
2
32
i − 1 + 2−i3
)
− 23n 232i > 25n
(
2
32
i − 1)+ 1. Therefore,
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Pr[bi < (
2
3
2i − 1)L+ 1] < Pr [bi < E[bi] (1− 2−2n)]
≤ e−2−4nE[bi]/2 applying a Chernoff bound
≤ e−2n−2 since E[bi] ≥ L/2 = 25n−1
By a union bound for all n possible values of i we get that Pr[E] < 1− ne−2n−2 .
Therefore, the revenue of the optimal symmetric mechanism is at most N2−(n−1) = L(2n −
1)2−(n−1) ≤ 2L when event E happens and at most Ln otherwise. Thus, the expected revenue is
at most L(2 + n2e−2
n−2
). Since the optimal asymmetric mechanism achieves revenue Ln/4, the
approximation ratio is n/8 + o(1). Since the number of agents is at most N ≤ 26n, we have that
n ≥ logN/6. Thus the approximation ratio in terms of N is logN48 + o(1) = Θ(logN) = Θ(logm)
since m = N in the digital goods setting.
5 Anonymous Auctions with Limited Ambiguity
In the previous section, we showed that the best anonymous auction cannot offer better worst-case
revenue guarantees than single price mechanisms, even when distributions are regular or have a
monotone hazard rate. In this section, we explore a key property called limited ambiguity that
separates anonymous mechanisms from single price mechanisms and demonstrates their power.
Definition 5.1. Let [ai, bi] be the support of the distribution of agent i and assume without loss of
generality that a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ... ≥ an. We say that the set of distributions is k-ambiguous if bi < ai−1−k
for all i, i.e. a sample from the i-th distribution can be confused with at most k distributions ahead
of it.
The extreme case where k = 0 — i.e. bidders’ values are drawn from distributions with disjoint
supports — gives our first separation between general anonymous auctions and single price mecha-
nisms. It is easy to see that single price mechanisms cannot achieve approximation ratio bounded
by a function of k for 0-ambiguous distributions. Consider the single point distribution 1/i for each
agent i— it is easy to see that the approximation ratio of any single price is log n, which cannot be
bounded by a function of k. In contrast, we showed that the optimal anonymous auction achieves
the same revenue as the optimal non-anonymous auction in Section 3.
In this section, we will show that anonymous mechanisms can guarantee an approximation ratio
of O(k) for k-ambiguous distributions, and that this is tight. We focus first on the case of digital
goods, where m = n, and then extend to m < n as well as to sponsored search auctions.
To show that anonymous mechanisms can achieve an O(k) approximation to the optimal rev-
enue, we construct a simple mechanism called the Decreasing Price Mechanism (DPM) that is
efficiently defined by n prices. We will begin with a slight variation that is not dominant strategies
incentive compatible (DSIC) to motivate the choice of mechanism.
Definition 5.2 (Non-DSIC Decreasing Price Mechanism). The Non-DSIC Decreasing Price Mech-
anism is defined by a set of prices p1 ≥ p2 ≥ ... ≥ pn and works as follows: incoming bids are sorted
in decreasing order, then bidder i is offered an item at price pi.
This mechanism is both simple and anonymous, but unfortunately it is not DSIC, since a bidder
can lower the price she pays simply by ranking lower in the ordering of bids (indeed, she can always
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get an item at price pn simply by placing the lowest bid). We add two key ingredients to define
our DSIC decreasing price mechanism.
The first ingredient we add limits a bidder’s ability to win the item at a lower price: the auction
only sells an item at price pi if it has successfully sold items at all higher prices. Consequently, for
example, bidder i+ 1 must be willing to pay pi in order for bidder i have a chance to win an item
at a lower price. When the auction fails to sell an item at price pi and therefore stops selling more
items, we call this a “drop” event.
The second ingredient we add restores incentive compatibility: if a bidder could have won an
item at a lower price by ranking lower in the bid order, then we automatically charge her the lower
price instead. Observe that given our first modification, bidder i can win an item at a lower price
pl if and only if bj ≥ pj−1 for all j ∈ {i + 1, . . . , l}. We call this a “chain” effect since there is a
chain of bidders with bj ≥ pj−1.
These two additional ingredients are the intuition for our decreasing price mechanism:
Definition 5.3 (Decreasing Price Mechanism). The Decreasing Price Mechanism (DPM) is defined
by a set of prices p1 ≥ p2 ≥ ... ≥ pn and works as follows:
• Sort bids in decreasing order.
• Starting with i = 1, allocate items as long as bi ≥ pi, then stop allocating items.
• Each winner i is charged pj(i), where j(i) is the smallest j ≥ i such that exactly j bidders are
bidding above pj .
We note that single price mechanisms are a special case of DPM where all the prices p1 = ... =
pn = p. The following lemma shows several interesting properties of DPM.
Lemma 5.1. The Decreasing Price Mechanism is anonymous, ex-post IR, DSIC, and monotone
in the sense that if bi > bj, then Ai(b) ≥ Aj(b).
Proof. It is clear that the mechanism is anonymous because it ignores any initial labeling and
relabels bidders in decreasing order of their bids. The auction is individually rational because a
bidder only wins if bi ≥ pi and pays a price pj(i) ≤ pi. The claimed monotonicity property is also
easy to see as the mechanism considers bids in decreasing order and allocates items only until it
reaches the first bidder with bi < pi.
To see that the mechanism is DSIC, we look at an agent i and show that i cannot win an item
at a lower price. Note that if i changes her bid to b′i < pj(i), then there will be j(i)− 1 bids ≥ pj(i)
(there were exactly j(i) such bids before i changed her bid) and the auction must stop by the time
it reaches reaches bidder j(i). Thus, the auction will not sell an item for less than pj(i), so i will not
get an item. On the other hand, keeping other bids fixed, if i bids bi ≥ pj(i), there will be exactly
j(i) bidders bidding ≥ pj(i), so i cannot win at a price less than pj(i).
We will now show that the decreasing price mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of O(k)
for k-ambiguous distributions. To illustrate the significant ideas in the proof we will first show the
statement for k = 1 before proving the general case.
5.1 The case of k = 1
For 1-ambiguous distributions, we prove the following theorem:
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Theorem 5.2. The optimal Decreasing Price Mechanism approximates the revenue of the optimal
auction within a factor of 5 for 1-ambiguous distributions.
Proof. The proof has two parts. First, we use a distribution over DPM pricing schemes to approxi-
mate the revenue contribution of agents 3 to n. This distribution will have expected revenue that is
a 3-approximation to the welfare of those agents and therefore also to the revenue they contribute
in the optimal auction. Second, we use our single price results to cover the revenue from the first
two agents.
First, to cover the revenue contributions of agents 3 to n, DPM prices are chosen as follows (the
parameters ri will be chosen later):
pi =
{
ai−1 with probability ri
ai otherwise.
Intuitively, choosing pi = ai is safe because vi ≥ ai, whereas pi = ai−1 extracts more revenue at
the risk of triggering a drop event that prevents selling items to bidders > i. We take r1 = 0 so
p1 = a1.
Let qi be the probability that vi ≥ ai−1 and define q1 = 0. We define ci, the conditional
likelihood of a chain effect, and di, the conditional likelihood of a drop event, as follows:
ci ≡ Pr[vi ≥ ai−1 and pi = ai] = (1 − ri)qi
di ≡ Pr[vi < pi] = ri(1− qi)
By definition of the auction, agent i pays at least at for some t ≥ i if and only if (a) all bidders
j ≤ i have vj ≥ pj so that bidder i wins an item, and (b) there exists a j ∈ {i+1, . . . , t+1} such that
exactly j bidders have bids bj ≥ pj . Condition (a) is equivalent to saying that a drop event does not
occur among the first i bidders and happens with probability
∏i
j=1(1−dj). Condition (b), assuming
truthfulness and using 1-ambiguity, happens if and only if there is some j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , t+ 1} such
that either vj < aj−1 or pj = aj−1, which happens precisely when j does not trigger a chain effect,
so the likelihood that such a j exists is 1−∏t+1j=i+1 cj .
Let xt denote the expected number of bidders who pay at and yt =
∑t
i=1 xi the expected number
who pay at least at. We can now write yt as
yt ≥
t∑
i=1
Pr[Agent i pays at least at] ≥
t∑
i=1



1− t+1∏
j=i+1
cj

 i∏
j=1
(1− dj)

 .
To bound this sum, we relate the ci’s and di’s with the following lemma:
Lemma 5.3. We can choose ri such that di ≤ ρ and ci ≤ (1−√ρ)2 for any ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. For any such ρ choose ri = min(
ρ
(1−qi)
, 1). We have that di = (1 − qi)ri ≤ ρ. We also have
that ci = (1− ri)qi. If ri = 1 then ci = 0 ≤ (1−√ρ)2. Otherwise ri = ρ(1−qi) and ci = (1−
ρ
(1−qi)
)qi
which achieves a maximum value at (1−√ρ)2 for qi = 1−√ρ,
Applying this lemma with ρ = 1/i2 gives ri’s such that di ≤ 1/i2 and ci ≤ (1 − 1/i)2 for
i ≥ 2. This makes ∏ij=1(1 − di) ≥ ∏ij=2(1 − 1/i2) = (1 + 1/i)/2 ≥ 1/2. Moreover, ∏t+1j=i+1 ci ≤∏t+1
j=i+1(1− 1/i)2 = (i/(t+ 1))2. Therefore,
yt ≥ 1
2
t∑
i=1
[
1−
(
i
t+ 1
)2]
=
1
2
(
t− t(t+ 1)(2t+ 1)
6(t+ 1)2
)
≥ 1
2
(t− t/3) ≥ t/3
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The total expected revenue of the mechanism is
∑n
i=1 xiai. Since yt =
∑t
i=1 xi ≥ t/3 for all t,
it must be that
∑n
i=1 xiai ≥
∑n
i=1 ai/3. Moreover, since at > bt+2 ≥ Rev[Agentt+2], it follows that∑n
t=1 at/3 ≥
∑n
t=3Rev[Agentt]/3, i.e. the revenue is at least 1/3 of the optimal revenue generated
by agents 3 to n.
It remains to handle the revenue contributed by the first two agents. To do so, we use the single
price lemma that says that a single price p is a 2-factor approximation for 2 distributions. If we
choose prices p1 = ... = pn = p with probability 2/5 or the pricing scheme that is defined above
with probability 3/5, we get an expected revenue of at least:
2
5
(
Rev[Agent1] +Rev[Agent2]
2
)
+
3
5
(∑n
t=3Rev[Agentt]
3
)
=
∑n
t=1Rev[Agentt]
5
Since we are randomizing over DPM pricing schemes, there exists a single pricing scheme that
achieves the necessary approximation. This completes the proof and shows a 5 approximation.
5.2 The general case
For general k-ambiguous distributions, the following theorem shows an O(k) approximation.
Theorem 5.4. The Decreasing Price Mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of (3e2+2)k for
k-ambiguous distributions.
The proof of this theorem mimics the 1-ambiguous case. We split agents into blocks of size k
such that an agent in block t cannot be confused with any agents in blocks < t−1, then a technical
lemma analogous to Lemma 5.3 bounds the drop and chain rates between blocks to achieve an O(k)
approximation to the revenue from blocks 3 to n/k. Finally, a single price mechanism covers the
revenue from the top two blocks.
—
Proof. To begin, we split agents into N = ⌈n/k⌉ blocks, such that block 1 contains agents 1 through
k, block 2 contains agents from k + 1 to 2k and so on. Notice that as previously agents in block i
cannot be confused with agents in blocks < i − 1. Let Ai be the lowest value an agent in block i
can take, i.e. Ai = ai·k.
We will first approximate the revenue contribution of blocks 3 to N . The main ideas follow
the 1-ambiguous proof. For each block i, we randomly pick a number of items j to price “high:”
the top j items in block i are priced at Ai−1, and the remaining k − j items are priced at Ai. A
block “drops” if we over-estimate the number of bidders who are willing to pay Ai−1; if block i
drops, then the auction will not allocate to any bidders in blocks > i. Similarly, a block “chains”
if we underestimate the number of bidders who are willing to pay Ai−1; if a block chains, then the
auction will not be able to charge Ai−1 to any bidder, since there will be too many bidders willing
to pay Ai−1.
Formally, we set prices for each block as follows:
1. Sample j according to the distribution Ri,j. (
∑k
j=0Ri,j = 1)
2. Set the prices for the first j items in the block at Ai−1 and set prices for the remaining k− j
items at Ai:
pi =
{
A⌊i/k⌋ if i− ⌊i/k⌋ ≤ j
A⌈i/k⌉ otherwise.
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We set R1,· = (1, 0, 0, 0, ..., 0) so that all agents of block 1 are assigned a price of A1.
To define chain and drop probabilities, let Qi,j be the probability that exactly j bidders in block
i have value greater or equal to Ai−1. We define Q1· = (1, 0, 0, ..., 0). We define the associated chain
probability Ci as the likelihood that the number of agents in block i who are willing to pay Ai−1
strictly exceeds the number of prices in the block that were set at Ai−1:
Ci =
k−1∑
j=0
k∑
j′=j+1
Ri,jQi,j′ .
Similarly, we define the associated drop probability Di as the likelihood that the number of agents
in block i who are willing to pay Ai−1 is strictly less than the number of prices that were set at
Ai−1:
Di =
k−1∑
j=0
k∑
j′=j+1
Qi,jRi,j′ .
We claim that agents in block i pay at least At for some t ≥ i as long as (a) no block ≤ i
“drops,” and (b) at least one block j ∈ {i + 1, . . . t + 1} does not “chain.” Note that if no block
≤ i drops, then all bidders in blocks ≤ i have v ≥ p and will therefore get allocated. This happens
with probability
∏i
j=1(1 −Dj). If any block j ∈ {i + 1, . . . , t + 1} does not chain, then we know
that the number of bidders asked to pay Aj−1 cannot be higher than the number of bidders asked;
consequently, Aj−1 will be a lower-bound on the price paid by bidders in block i. The likelihood
that at least one such block does not chain is 1−∏t+1j=i+1Cj .
Thus, if we define Xt as the expected number of blocks whose agents pay At and Yt =
∑t
i=1Xi
be the expected number of blocks where all agents pay at least At, then:
Yt ≥
t∑
i=1
Pr[Agents in block i pay at least At] ≥
t∑
i=1



1− t+1∏
j=i+1
Cj

 i∏
j=1
(1−Dj)


We use the following lemma to relate Ci’s and Di’s.
Lemma 5.5. We can choose Ri,· such that Di ≤ ρ and Ci ≤ 1− ρ1−
1
k+1 for any ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Let Qˆi,j =
∑j
z=0Qi,z and Qˆi,−1 = 0. We consider distributions Ri,j that take the following
form:
Ri,j =


min(1, ρ/Qˆi,(s−1)) if j = s
1−Ri,s if j = 0
0 otherwise
where s is a parameter that will be chosen later. Notice that for any s, we have that:
Di =
k−1∑
j=0
k∑
z=j+1
Qi,jRi,z =
k∑
z=1
z−1∑
j=0
Qi,jRi,z =
s−1∑
j=0
Qi,jRi,s = Qˆi,(s−1)Ri,s ≤ ρ
and
Ci =
k−1∑
j=0
k∑
z=j+1
Ri,jQi,z =
k−1∑
j=0
Ri,j(1− Qˆi,j) ≤ 1−Ri,sQˆi,s
We are now ready to prove that there exists choice of s such that Ci ≤ 1 − ρ1−
1
k+1 . We will
do this by assuming the contrary, namely that Ci > 1 − ρ1−
1
k+1 for any choice of s, and reach a
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contradiction. Note that this assumption immediately implies that Ri,jQˆi,j ≤ 1− Ci < ρ1−
1
k+1 for
any j. Before we begin, note that Qˆi,−1 = 0, Qˆi,k = 1, and Qˆi,j is monotone in j.
We let j∗ be the smallest j that ρ ≤ Qˆi,j and show inductively that for any z ≥ j∗,
Qˆi,z < ρ
k−(z−j∗)
k+1 .
Base case z = j∗: When z = j∗, we can choose s = z. Since Qˆi,(z−1) ≤ ρ, we have that Ri,z = 1
and thus we get Qˆi,z = Ri,zQˆi,z < ρ
1− 1
k+1 (using our contrary assumption).
Inductive step: Now, we assume the hypothesis holds for some z and prove it holds for z + 1.
We could choose s = z + 1, in which case Ri,(z+1) = ρ/Qˆi,z . Since Ri,(z+1)Qˆi,(z+1) < ρ
1− 1
k+1 , we
get that
Qˆi,(z+1) <
ρ1−
1
k+1
Ri,(z+1)
<
Qˆi,zρ
1− 1
k+1
ρ
<
ρ
k−(z−j∗)
k+1 ρ1−
1
k+1
ρ
= ρ
k−(z+1−j∗)
k+1
which completes the proof of the induction.
We can now reach a contradiction by seeing that Qˆi,k = 1 < ρ
k−(k−j∗)
k+1 = ρ
j∗
k+1 ≤ 1.
Applying the lemma with ρ = 1
(ki)1+1/k
gives Ri,· such that Di ≤ 1(ki)1+1/k and Ci ≤ (1− 1ki) for
i ≥ 2. We have that:
i∏
j=1
(1−Dj) ≥
i∏
j=2
exp(− Dj
1−Dj ) ≥ exp(−2
i∑
j=2
Dj) since Dj <
1
2
≥ exp(−2
k
i∑
j=2
j−(1+1/k)) ≥ exp(−2
k
∫ i
1
x−(1+1/k)dx)
= exp(−2
k
[−kx−1/k]i1) ≥ e−2
Moreover, we have that
t∑
i=1
t+1∏
j=i+1
Cj ≤
t∑
i=1
t+1∏
j=i+1
(1− 1
kj
) ≤
t∑
i=1
exp(−
t+1∑
j=i+1
1
kj
)
≤
t∑
i=1
exp(−1
k
∫ t+2
i+1
1
x
dx)
≤
t∑
i=1
exp(− log(
t+2
i+1 )
k
) =
t∑
i=1
(
i+ 1
t+ 2
)1/k
≤ t
(∑t
i=1(i+ 1)/t
t+ 2
)1/k
Jensen’s inequality for x1/k
= t
(
t+ 3
2(t+ 2)
)1/k
≤ t(2/3)1/k
So overall we have that Yt ≥ e−2t(1− (2/3)1/k) ≥ t3e2k .
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The expected revenue of the randomized pricing scheme will be at least
∑N−1
t=1 kAtXt.
5 Since
each Yt =
∑t
i=1Xt ≥ t3e2k , we get that the expected revenue by the randomized pricing scheme is
at least
∑N−1
t=1
kAt
3e2k
>
∑N
t=3
Rev[Blockt]
3e2k
since kAt > Rev[Blockt+2].
To bound the revenue of the first two blocks we use the single price lemma that says that a single
price p is a 2k-factor approximation for 2k distributions. If we choose prices p1 = ... = pn = p with
probability 2/(3e2 + 2) or the pricing scheme that is defined above with probability 3e2/(3e2 + 2),
we get an expected revenue of at least:
2
3e2 + 2
(
Rev[Block1] +Rev[Block2]
2k
)
+
3e2
3e2 + 2
(∑N
t=3Rev[Blockt]
3e2k
)
=
∑N
t=1Rev[Blockt]
(3e2 + 2)k
Since we are randomizing over pricing schemes there exists a single pricing scheme that achieves
the necessary approximation. This completes the proof and shows an O(k) approximation.
5.3 Extension to m-goods and position auctions
We extend the results of the previous section from digital goods, where we have an unlimited supply
of identical goods, to the m-unit setting where we have m copies of a good and to position auctions.
Definition 5.4 (Position auction). In a position auction, there are m items are for sale, each with
a scale factor sj ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ ... ≥ sm. The utility of an agent i with value
vi that receives an item j and pays p is equal to sjvi − p.
In sponsored search auctions auctions, the items are slots on a page of search results and the
scale factors correspond to the click through rate of the slot.
Theorem 5.6. In any m-good or position auction setting, there exists an anonymous mechanism
that achieves an approximation of O(k) for k-ambiguous distributions.
Since m-good auctions are a special case of position auctions with sj = 1 for all j, it suffices
to prove this theorem for position auction settings. Moreover, we can assume w.l.o.g. that m = n
since we can always add additional items with sj = 0.
The first step in proving the theorem is getting an upper bound on the revenue of the optimal
mechanism.
Lemma 5.7. For any position auction setting with k-ambiguous distributions, the maximum achiev-
able revenue is at most
∑k+1
i=1 s1Rev[Fi] +
∑n−k−1
i=1 siai, where Rev[Fi] is the Myerson revenue of
agent i’s distribution.
Proof. Consider a setting where we have an additional copy of every item and we run 2 auctions
instead of one:
• Auction A: The k + 1 first agents are participating.
• Auction B: The n− (k + 1) last agents are participating.
We claim that the revenue in this setting is not less than the revenue from the original auction
by arguing that the following mechanism gets exactly the same revenue as before. Let M be the
optimal mechanism in the original setting. Run M in each auction by sampling bids from the
distributions of the missing agents. It is easy to see that the first auction achieves revenue equal
5We ignore the last block since it might have fewer than k agents.
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to the revenue contribution of the first k + 1 agents in the original auction while the second one
achieves revenue equal to the revenue contribution of the last n − (k + 1) agents in the original
auction. So it suffices to bound the revenue of each of the two auctions separately.
For the auction A, we can see that an auction A’ where there are unlimited copies of item 1
(with scale factor s1) would give us at least as much revenue since scale factors of the items could
be artificially reduced to match those in auction A. Therefore the revenue of the first auction is
upper bounded by
∑k+1
i=1 s1Rev[Fi].
For the auction B, we can see that an auction B’ where each agent comes from a point distri-
bution with value ai instead of the original distribution supported in [ai+k+1, bi+k+1] would achieve
at least as much revenue. This is because, in auction B’, the bids of each agent can be completely
ignored and resampled from the previous distribution for every agent and then run the optimal
mechanism for auction B. This mechanism is definitely DSIC since it doesn’t depend at all at the
agent bids and is IR since ai > bi+k+1 which means that an agent in auction B
′ will always afford
to pay the asked price. The revenue in auction B’ is exactly
∑n−k−1
i=1 siai which gives us the upper
bound for auction B.
We now try to construct a mechanism that achieves good approximation guarantees compared
to the bound on revenue we’ve proven. We alter slightly the rules of the decreasing price mechanism
with the following rule. Agents that are asked to pay price pj in the original DPM will get item j
and pay sjpj.
Notice that although more than 1 agent may be assigned to item j, the effect of item j can
be simulated by giving an item with higher scale factor j′ < j to each additional agent but with
probability sj/sj′ . Since for every j there are at most j agents assigned to items 1 through j this
mechanism is feasible. This mechanism is also DSIC since if agent i is priced pj any bid higher than
pj gets him exactly the same price and allocation while any bid lower than pj gets him dropped of
the mechanism without any item. Therefore bidding his real value is preferable since the mechanism
is clearly IR.
We use the randomized construction of the previous section to create the DPM mechanism.
Under this construction, a price of at least At is assigned to
t
3e2k blocks in expectation which gives
a revenue at least
∑N−1
t=1 kAtSt/(3e
2k) where St = stk is the scale factor of the item agents that
are priced At receive. Since kAtSt ≥
∑tk+k−1
i=tk siai, we get revenue of at least
∑n−k−1
i=k
siai
3e2k
.
To bound the remaining terms of the revenue, we use second price auction with a single price p
to sell just the first item. With probability 1/2 we set p to be the Myerson reserve of the first agent
while with probability 1/(2k) we set p to be the the reserve price of the i-th agent for i = 2 to k+1.
This is an anonymous mechanism and gets revenue at least s1(kRev[F1] +
∑k+1
i=2 Rev[Fi])/(2k).
If we run the DPM mechanism with probability 2/(3e2 + 2) or the second price auction with
probability 3e2/(3e2 + 2), we get an expected revenue of at least:
2
3e2 + 2
(
s1(kRev[F1] +
∑k+1
i=2 Rev[Fi])
2k
)
+
3e2
3e2 + 2
(
n−k−1∑
i=k
siai
3e2k
)
which is at least ∑k+1
i=1 s1Rev[Fi] +
∑n−k−1
i=1 siai
(3e2 + 2)k
This completes the proof and shows an O(k) approximation.
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6 Conclusion
Anonymity imposes real constraints on an auction and, as we have seen, on the revenue it can
achieve. In the worst case, we have shown that anonymous mechanisms are quite limited, and that
the best anonymous mechanism cannot substantially beat a simple single price. The real advantage
of an anonymous mechanism is directly related to the auctioneer’s ability to infer information about
fi and vi from the bids of other advertisers, v−i, in essence circumventing the ex-ante anonymity
requirement.
Our work leaves a few immediate open questions about anonymous auctions with limited am-
biguity. We showed that anonymous auctions can achieve a Θ(k) approximation for general k-
ambiguous distributions. For single price mechanisms, we saw that the worst-case approximation
improves from Θ(n) to Θ(log n) when distributions are regular — can we show an analogous Θ(log k)
bound in the k-ambiguous setting when distributions are regular? Another interesting research di-
rection is to identify alternative metrics for measuring ambiguity. For example, what can we say
about the revenue from an anonymous auction when the differential entropy between fi and the
inferred posterior h is small?
More broadly, our work suggests many general questions about anonymous mechanisms. Can
anonymous auctions achieve good approximations beyond the settings we have studied? Interesting
dependencies arise outside the digital goods setting because one bidder’s bid can affect the auction-
eer’s inference about another bidder, affecting the outcome of the auction in a complicated way.
Another question is one of computational complexity — how difficult is it to compute the optimal
anonymous auction?
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A Characterizing Optimal Anonymous Mechanisms
In this section, we generalize our characterization theorem from Section 3 in the special case where
the inferred poster h is regular. Recall the observations we made:
Observation A.1 (Observation 3.1). The optimal anonymous mechanism remains optimal if we
randomly rename bidders before running the auction.
Observation A.2 (Observation 3.2). Suppose that prior beliefs F are symmetric (possibly corre-
lated). Then there exists a symmetric mechanism that maximizes revenue.
These observations immediately lead to the following claim that reduces symmetric optimization
to general optimization:
Claim A.3 (Claim 3.3). Any mechanism that is optimal among dominant strategies IC and ex-post
IR mechanisms for the symmetric distribution
g(x) =
1
n!
∑
π∈Π(n)
∏
i∈N
fi(xπi)
can be transformed into a mechanism that is optimal among symmetric, DSIC, and ex-post IR
auctions for the beliefs F by relabeling bidders according to a uniformly random permutation.
To understand the optimal symmetric mechanism, we use the following theorem of Roughgarden
and Talgam-Cohen [13]:
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Theorem A.4 (Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [13]). In a private, correlated values setting, the
optimal mechanism M = (A,P) that is both DSIC and ex-post IR is the following, as long as φ is
monotone (h is regular):
1. Elicit values v from the bidders.
2. For each bidder i, infer a posterior belief h(vi|v−i) about the distribution of vi from other
bidders values v−i. Let φ
h|v−i(vi) = vi − 1−H(v|v−i)h(vi|v−i) denote the virtual value of a bidder with
respect to this inferred distribution.
3. Maximize virtual value
∑
i φ
h|v−i(vi) under the posterior beliefs and charge according to
P(v) = viAi(v)−
∫ vi
0 Ai(v−i, z)dz (i.e. traditional single-parameter payments [12, 1]).
Given this characterization and the preceding claim, our general characterization theorem is
immediate:
Theorem A.5. The optimal anonymous mechanism is the following, as long as φ is monotone (h
is regular):
1. Elicit values v from the bidders.
2. Imagine that values were drawn from a correlated distribution g(v) where
g(x) =
1
n!
∑
π∈Π(n)
∏
i∈N
fi(xπi)
and, for each bidder i, use the values v−i of other bidders to infer a posterior belief h(vi|v−i) =
g(v−i,vi)∫∞
0
g(v−i,z)dz
about the distribution of vi. Let φ
h|v−i(vi) = vi − 1−H(v|v−i)h(vi|v−i) denote the virtual
value of a bidder with respect to this inferred distribution.
3. Maximize virtual value
∑
i φ
h|v−i(vi) under the posterior beliefs and charge according to
P(v) = viAi(v)−
∫ vi
0 Ai(v−i, z)dz (i.e. traditional single-parameter payments [12, 1]).
The characterization we gave in Section 3 of the optimal symmetric auction for digital goods is
then an immediate corollary:
Corollary A.6. The optimal anonymous digital goods auction sets the optimal price for each bidder
according to the posterior belief h.
Also, the extreme cases noted in Section 3 behave similarly:
Corollary A.7. If the distributions fi are point distributions (bidders’ values are known precisely
to the auctioneer), have non-overlapping support, or are the same for all bidders, then the optimal
anonymous mechanism coincides with Myerson’s optimal mechanism.
In all three cases, the posterior distribution inferred from v−i is precisely fi, therefore the
auction precisely identifies each bidder and runs the optimal auction.
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